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While previous research has shown that human decision processes adjust 
to the characteristics of choice situations and task demands, the present 
study examined whether information processing would even adapt to the 
characteristics of an individual choice pair. By a process tracing method it 
was found that the amount of inspected information systematically 
depended upon the particular choice pair. In order to specify the selective 
and adaptive information processing, criterion-dependent choice models 
were introduced. These models postulate that information processing 
continues until the accumulated amount by which one alternative is better 
than the other reaches or exceeds a certain criterion. These models are 
strongly supported by the empirical data of the present study. Deviations 
between model predictions and observed data are explained in terms of 
fluctuating feature values of the choice alternatives. 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Over twenty years of research have shown that instead of normative 
rules, humans employ heuristic strategies for decision making (Slovic, 
Fischhoff and Lichtenstein, 1977). For the human information pro-
cessor, heuristic strategies have several advantages over rigid rules. 
Above all, a heuristic strategy reduces the cognitive effort of choosing. 
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One possibility for reducing choice effort is to process only selected 
parts of the information about the choice alternatives. In such a 
situation, the importance of an information unit may in part determine 
which information is processed by a decision heuristic. Since decision 
heuristics can be applied to varied situations, they also enable the 
cognitive processing to be more flexible with respect to the givens of a 
choice situation. 
When alternatives are presented by multidimensional descriptions, a 
person may differentiate between relevant and irrelevant dimensions. By 
processing only those features of the choice alternatives that lie on the 
relevant dimensions, the amount of information processing may be 
substantially reduced. 
Basically, two possibilities exist for determining which dimensions 
and features are processed in a given choice situation. Firstly, a person 
may specify the relevant dimensions prior to considering any particular 
alternatives. When confronted with choice alternatives, this person 
would then process the features on the dimensions that had previously 
been determined to be relevant. For example, when choosing a news 
magazine, a person who is interested in science and politics may 
determine that articles on science, articles on politics, and the price of 
the magazine would be the only relevant dimensions. Therefore, when 
choosing between two magazines, this person would only process the 
features of these three dimensions. For instance, if the choice between 
two German magazines, Capital and Der Spiegel, were presented to this 
person, the only relevant information would be: 
1. number of articles on science 4 vs. 1, 
2. number of articles on politics 70 vs. 25, 
3. price of the magazine 6 D M vs. 4 D M . 
Thus, this decisionmaker would always process the same number of 
feature pairs or dimensions regardless of the characteristics of the 
particular choice pair. 
Choice processes, however, have also been found to be extremely 
flexible (Payne, 1982). It may therefore be suspected that decision-
makers can adapt their information processing to the characteristics of 
the choice alternatives themselves. For example, random walk models 
that have been successfully applied to the analysis of performance in 
psychophysical tasks, such as discriminating between two alternative 
events (Vickers, Caudrey and Willson, 1971), would predict that the 
amount of information being processed would systematically depend 
upon the characteristics (e.g. similarity or discriminability) of the 
stimuli. Cognitive information processing may similarly adjust to the 
characteristics of a choice pair when one of two real alternatives is to be 
selected. A decisionmaker may therefore only process as many features 
as are required to choose between the particular two alternatives given. 
The number of features processed for a choice would thus systematically 
depend upon some characteristic of the choice alternatives. For example, 
more information processing may be desired for alternatives whose 
features are about equally attractive than for alternatives whose features 
strongly differ in their attractiveness. Schmalhofer and Saffrich1 have 
shown that for real alternatives such adaptive choice heuristics may 
produce a quite favourable relationship between the cognitive effort of 
choosing and the quality of the resulting choice. 
In order to investigate whether people process multidimensional 
descriptions of alternatives selectively, a process-tracing experiment was 
performed with binary choice alternatives. If such selective information 
processing does, indeed, occur, this experiment should also determine 
whether subjects process the same number of features for every choice 
pair or whether the number of processed features varies systematically 
with characteristics of a choice pair, such as the similarity between the 
choice alternatives. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Subjects were individually presented with multidimensionally described 
choice pairs shown on a display board. While this display board always 
revealed the names of the dimensions by which the alternatives were 
described, the features of a choice pair had to be separately uncovered 
for each dimension. Thus, subjects had to request the alternatives' 
features on one of the dimensions successively until they wanted to make 
a choice. The inspected feature pairs, as well as the subjects' choices, 
were recorded for every choice pair. In order to allow for some 
additional analyses, the subjects also had to rate the attractiveness of 
every feature of the choice alternatives. 
Method 
Subjects 
Twenty-eight students from the University of Heidelberg, who were paid ten 
Marks per hour, participated in the experiment. Because of possible knowledge 
of decision research, students of business, economics, mathematics, and psy-
chology were not permitted to participate in the experiment. 
'Schmalhofer, F., & Saffrich, W. (1984). Effort-quality trade-off characteristics of 
selective information processing. Working paper, University of Heidelberg. 
Materials 
The choice tasks consisted of choosing a one-year subscription to a news 
magazine. Six real magazines, each of which was described by its features on 11 
dimensions, were used as choice alternatives. All possible pairs of alternatives 
were constructed, thus yielding a complete paired comparison with 15 choice 
pairs. A choice pair could show the same feature for both alternatives on up to 
four dimensions. An English translation of a sample choice pair is shown in 
Table I. 
Apparatus 
An Apple II microcomputer with a game paddle was used for collecting the 
attractiveness estimates for all 11 features of every choice alternative. The 
information display consisted of a cardboard frame with a rectangular window 
big enough to show the 11 dimensions and the 22 features of a choice pair, which 
were printed on a sheet of paper. This sheet of paper was lying underneath the 
cardboard frame, so that the 11 dimensions were always exposed by the window 
frame, and the 11 little doors attached to the frame could individually cover or 
uncover given feature pairs. 
Procedure 
Subjects first evaluated the attractiveness of the alternatives' features with 
respect to the subscription situation. Each of the 66 features was individually 
presented on the videoscreen of an Apple II microcomputer: The order of 
presentation was newly randomized for every subject. Together with each 
individual feature, the name of the respective dimension and a rating scale with 
seven categories (1-7) appeared on the screen. The extreme categories of this 
rating scale were labelled "unattractive" and "very attractive". By turning a 
Table I 
A Sample Choice Pair as it Would be Seen by a Subject Who Uncovered 
All 11 Dimensions 
Features of alternative 
Dimensions A B 
Frequency of publication monthly weekly 
No. of articles on science 4 1 
No. of advertisements 120 180 
Price of magazine 6.-DM 4.-DM 
No. of articles on politics 70 25 
No. of articles on ecology 1 5 
No. of articles on entertainment 5 3 
No. of articles on cultural events 3 5 
No. of pictures 15 15 
No. of colour pictures 10 3 
No. of pages in magazine 350 300 
dial, a pointer could be moved to any of the seven attractiveness categories on the 
screen, so that the subject could classify the presented feature into one of the 
seven categories. 
The subjects were then given 15 trials in which they had to choose between 
two news magazines. At the beginning of every choice, subjects only saw the 
names of the 11 dimensions used to describe the alternatives. They could then 
request and inspect a feature pair of any dimension, which remained visible 
thereafter. After inspecting these features, subjects could request the features of 
another dimension. This procedure was repeated until a subject wanted to make 
a choice. Subjects were instructed to inspect as many feature pairs or dimensions 
(up to 11) as they liked before making a choice. In addition to the choices, the 
selected dimensions were recorded by the experimenter and the number of 
processed dimensions was calculated for every choice pair. 
Choice pairs were presented in a previously specified order, so that for every 
presented alternative it was guaranteed that at least one pair of other alternatives 
would intervene before the same alternative recurred in the sequence of choice 
pairs. Subjects were run in individual sessions, which were completely subject-
paced and lasted about one hour. Both rating and choice tasks were preceded by 
some practice trials with unrelated materials. 
Results 
The number of inspected feature pairs clearly indicated that subjects 
employed selective information processing, rather than processing every 
feature of a choice pair: From the 11 possible features of an alternative, 
subjects inspected only 5.97 features (SD = 2.31) on average. In order to 
determine whether for a given subject the number of inspected dimen-
sions was constant for all choice pairs, a cumulative frequency distribu-
tion of the number of inspected dimensions was plotted. This distribu-
tion specified the relative frequencies with which a subject processedy or 
less dimensions of a choice pair for all possible/s= 1,2, . . . , 11. 
Three types of distributions may be distinguished: A distribution 
that is always equal to zero, except fory= 11 where it is equal to one, 
characterizes the processing of all features. A second distribution type 
describes selective information processing with an equal number of 
dimensions being inspected for every choice pair. This type is specified 
by a single step from zero to one for some y < 11. Finally, a third type of 
distribution with several step increments from zero to one would 
indicate that for the different choice pairs, different numbers of dimen-
sions had been inspected. 
Figure 1 shows the cumulative frequency distributions of the three 
subjects who most closely matched the three types. By a visual inspec-
tion of the individual cumulative distribution functions every subject 
could easily and uniquely be assigned to exactly one of the three 
categories. The precise criteria for this classification were: frequency 
distributions with an average number of inspected dimensions > 10 and 
SD < 1 were classified as Type 1; frequency distributions with an 
average number of inspected dimensions < 10 and SD< 1 were classi-
fied as Type 2; and frequency distributions with an average number of 
inspected dimensions < 10 and SD> 1 were classified as Type 3. This 
classification showed that only two subjects, or 7%, processed nearly all 
features. For both of these subjects, the average number of inspected 
dimensions was 10.5; the respective standard deviations were 0.52 and 
0.64. Five subjects, or 18%, processed a smaller but mostly constant 
number of dimensions. For these subjects, the average number of 
requested dimensions ranged from 3.7 to 6.4, with a median of 3.9; the 
respective standard deviations ranged from 0.46 to 0.88, with a median 
value of 0.74. However, the majority of subjects, namely 21, or 75%, 
showed the third distribution type. For these subjects, the average 
number of requested features pairs ranged from 4.1 to 7.7 with a median 
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Figure 1. Cumulative frequency distributions of the number of inspected 
dimensions for three selected subjects. 
Note. The three subjects who most closely matched the three different types of 
frequency distributions are shown. 
of 6.0; the respective standard deviations ranged from 1.0 to 2.4, with 
the median standard deviation being 1.6. 
These results show that most subjects inspected a variable number of 
dimensions. In order to demonstrate that the subjects' information 
processing adapted to the choice alternatives themselves, however, it 
must also be shown that the number of processed feature pairs systema-
tically depended upon the characteristics of the choice pairs. 
As mentioned earlier, for similar choice pairs more dimensions 
should be processed than for dissimilar pairs. In order to examine this 
hypothesis, the similarity of a choice pair was operationally defined. The 
number of dimensions with identical features was used as an indicator 
for the similarity of a choice pair. Rather than only the processed 
dimensions, all 11 dimensions of a choice pair were included for 
calculating the similarity index. Thus, the operational definition of 
similarity could be performed prior to, and completely independent of, 
the experimental data. Each choice pair was classified into a low-, 
medium- or high-similarity category. Thus, the 15 choice pairs were 
divided into three classes of five pairs each. For the classes with low, 
medium and high similarity the average numbers of identical features 
were 0, 1, and 2.6, respectively. 
The cumulative frequency distributions of Figure 2, which were 
calculated from all 28 subjects' data, show that the number of processed 
dimensions increased systematically with the similarity of the choice 
pairs. A one-way A N O V A with similarity and number of inspected 
dimensions as the independent and dependent variable, respectively, 
substantiated this observation [F(2, 54) = 7.12, p<0.005, M S E = 0.58]. 
When two different operational definitions of similarity, which were 
derived from the subjects' individual attractiveness ratings and the 
subjects' preferential choices, were used for defining the three similarity 
classes, the respective analyses of variance yielded identical results. 
Discussion 
The experimental results clearly demonstrate that a large majority of 
subjects did not process the same number of dimensions for every choice 
pair. Rather, the number of processed dimensions depended systemati-
cally upon the similarity of a choice pair, indicating that the subjects' 
information processing adapted to some characteristic of the choice 
alternatives. 
Since the multidimensional descriptions used in the experiment 
referred to popular German news magazines, the subjects may have 
been more or less familiar with the choice alternatives. It may be 
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Figure 2. Cumulative frequency distributions of the number of inspected 
dimensions for three classes of choice pairs. 
suspected that the decisionmakers' familiarity with the alternatives may 
influence the amount of information being processed2 (Phelps and 
Shanteau, 1978). Since in the present experiment the subjects were 
recruited from a comparatively homogeneous population (students), it 
was assumed that such differences in the familiarity with the alternatives 
would be negligible. However, in order to assess the stability of the 
experimental results, it is certainly worthwhile to examine whether (the 
degree of) selective and adaptive information processing depends upon 
the naturally existing differences in the familiarity with the choice 
alternatives. Furthermore, the stability of the present results was 
examined by testing whether the cognitive choice processes are 
influenced by a subject's expectation that he will actually receive one of 
the chosen news magazines. 
A person who regularly reads a news magazine is more likely to have 
developed some preconceptions about this and other news magazines. 
2Van Raaijj W. F. (1976). Consumer choice behavior: An information-processing 
approach. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Tilburg. 
During the choice task these preconceptions could facilitate the identifi-
cation of the choice alternatives. Therefore it could be argued that 
subjects who are more familiar with news magazines would first identify 
one or both of the presented alternatives before making a choice. Under 
these assumptions the identification of alternatives would be an essential 
component of the cognitive choice processes. Consequently, the 
observed selective and adaptive information processing could be attri-
buted to a subject's identification processes rather than to the choice 
processes. In order to examine the empirical validity of this argument, as 
well as the role of possible preconceptions about the choice alternatives, 
a second experiment was performed. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Except for the following modifications, this experiment was identical to 
the first one. The subjects were divided into two groups: Subjects who 
had subscribed to (or regularly read) at least one of the six magazines 
(subscribers) and subjects who did not regularly read any of the six 
magazines (non-subscribers). In order to evaluate whether subjects 
usually identify the alternatives before they make a choice, two of the 
choice pairs were once more presented to the subjects at the end of the 
experiment. Rather than choosing an alternative, subjects were now 
asked to uncover as many feature pairs as they wanted in order to 
identify the name of the alternatives. Thus the number of inspected 
feature pairs can be compared between choice and identification tasks 
for the same alternatives. 
Method 
Forty-two subjects were recruited according to the rules used in Experiment 1. 
Subjects were paid 10 Marks per hour for participating in the experiment. 
The same materials, apparatus and procedure were used as in the first 
experiment, with the following exceptions: After the choice tasks, subjects had 
to answer some questions. They were asked which magazines they regularly read 
or subscribed to and whether they had identified any magazine during the choice 
task. The answers to these two questions were used to form the two subject 
groups who supposedly differed by their familiarity with German news maga-
zines. Eighteen subjects did not regularly read any of the 6 news magazines, and 
24 subjects were regular readers of 1 to 3 magazines (average 1.5). Since exactly 
three of the subjects who had stated that they regularly read one of the news 
magazines were not even reminded of any particular magazine in the choice 
tasks, these subjects were also classified as non-subscribers. Thus the subjects 
were divided into 21 subscribers and 21 nonsubscribers. About half of the 
subjects («= 10) in each group were told that they would receive one of the 
magazines they had chosen during the experiment as a gift. At the end of the 
experiment a copy of one of the selected magazines was then given to them. 
After answering these questions, subjects were presented with one choice pair 
from the low-similarity category and one choice pair from the high-similarity 
category. As in the choice tasks, they had to uncover feature pairs step by step, 
however, with a different goal: Instead of choosing one of the alternatives, they 
now attempted to identify the alternatives by name. The number of dimensions 
inspected and the identification responses were recorded. 
Results 
This experiment replicated the previous results in all aspects for 
subscribers as well as non-subscribers. Subscribers inspected 6.31 
features (SD=1.86), whereas non-subscribers inspected 5.82 features 
(SD= 1.58), on average. This difference is not significant, r(40) = 0.91, 
p>0.05. Again, the majority of subjects processed a variable number of 
dimensions: Only 10% of the subscribers, and none of the non-
subscribers, inspected nearly all features. Distributions of Type 2 were 
found for 14% and 18% of the subscribers and non-subscribers, 
respectively. The majority of subjects, i.e. 76% of the subscribers and 
81% of the non-subscribers, inspected a variable number of feature 
pairs, resulting in distributions of Type 3. 
A (2x3) two-way A N O V A on the average number of inspected 
dimensions with subject group (subscribers vs. non-subscribers) and 
similarity of choice alternatives as the two independent factors did not 
yield a significant difference between subscribers and non-subscribers 
[F(l, 208) = 3.47, />>0.05, M S E = 10.29]. Again the number of pro-
cessed dimensions increased systematically with the similarity of the 
alternatives of a pair [F(2, 416)= 15.65, p< 0.001, M S E = 1.88]. How-
ever, there was no significant interaction (F< 1). 
Of the four alternatives given in the identification task, subscribers 
correctly identified an average of 1.5 alternatives (38%), while non-
subscribers correctly identified 0.9 of the alternatives (23%). An average 
of 0.7 and 0.8 incorrect journal names (17% and 19%) were given as 
identification responses by subscribers and non-subscribers, respecti-
vely. As would be expected, these numbers show that subscribers were 
somewhat better able to identify the journals by name [r(39)=1.85, 
/> = 0.07]. The size of the difference shows that with respect to precon-
ceptions about news magazines the two subject groups were also rather 
homogeneous. 
Subscribers and non-subscribers inspected significantly more fea-
tures [F(l, 40) = 76.21,p<0.001, M S E = 1.82] in the identification (8.33 
and 8.07, respectively) than in the choice tasks (5.95 and 5.31, respecti-
vely). Neither the difference between the subject groups (F< 1) nor the 
interaction (F< 1) was significant. 
Table II 
Subscribers* and Non-Subscribers3 Mean Number of Processed Dimensions and 
Identifications for the Choice Pair which Contained the Magazine "Stern" 
Stem-subscribers non-subscribers 








mean number of correct answers 





Note: The identification performance for the magazine Stern only, is shown 
in parentheses. 
The majority of subscribers, namely 13 subjects, had stated that they 
regularly read the magazine Stern. The above analysis was repeated for 
this subset of the subscribers (Stern-readers) versus the non-subscribers 
for the single choice pair containing the Stern as an alternative in the 
identification task. The results, which are shown in Table II, clearly 
indicate that even when a highly familiar magazine such as Stern is 
involved, subscribers and non-subscribers processed less information in 
the choice than in the identification task [F(l, 336)= 14.43, p<0.001, 
MSE=1.95]. Subscribers, however, processed more information than 
non-subscribers [F(l, 168) = 7.98, p<0.01, M S E = 9.40]. There was no 
interaction, F < 1. 
Whether or not subjects were promised a magazine as a gift did not 
influence the experimental results at all: There was neither a main effect 
(F< 1) nor an interaction with the similarity of a choice pair (F< 1). 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The present results clearly show that decisionmakers inspected more 
information when attempting to identify the alternatives of a pair than 
when choosing between them. Even with this additional information, 
subscribers and non-subscribers usually were unable to specify the 
magazines' names. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that for the reported 
experiments decisionmaking was generally not preceded by the identifi-
cation of the alternatives. We were initially surprised that even for 
magazine pairs for which subjects refrained from responding in the 
identification task, only selected feature pairs had been processed. For 
these pairs subjects supposedly did not see any chance of identifying an 
alternative. This again demonstrates that the identification of the 
alternatives was not necessary for choosing between them. The tendency 
for decisionmakers who are more familiar with the alternatives to 
process more dimensions than did unfamiliar subjects fits with the 
results of Phelps and Shanteau (1978), who found that expert judges 
used about 9 to 11 dimensions. 
Adaptive and selective choice processes, however, occurred for both 
subject groups regardless of their familiarity with news magazines 
independently of whether the decisionmaker would or would not receive 
one of the chosen magazines as a gift. Adaptiveness and selectivity may 
therefore be important characteristics of human choice processes. 
By using think-aloud methods, converging evidence for the stability 
of these characteristics has recently been supplied by Schmalhofer and 
Schafer (1985). Given the reported experimental evidence, the question 
arises as to how this result can be explained. A parsimonious explanation 
may be offered by the criterion-dependent choice models recently 
proposed by Aschenbrenner, Albert, and Schmalhofer (1984) that share 
central assumptions with random walk models (Wald, 1950). 
Criterion-Dependent Choice Models 
Criterion-dependent choice models share the following assumptions. A 
choice is derived by one or several sequential processing steps. For 
multidimensionally described choice pairs, a processing step would 
consist of the evaluation of a feature pair on one dimension. During this 
evaluation, the attractiveness difference between the two features is 
determined and added to the attractiveness differences already deter-
mined by the previous processing steps. The number of processing steps 
performed for making a choice depends upon a criterion that indicates 
that one alternative is better than the other by some amount: The 
information processing of a choice pair is terminated by a choice as soon 
as the accumulation of the calculated attractiveness differences reaches 
or surpasses this criterion. 
If for some choice pairs the criterion cannot be reached, a choice is 
made when no additional new information about the alternatives is 
available to be processed. In either case, the accumulated attractiveness 
differences determine which alternative is chosen. 
Because for different choice pairs, the criterion may be reached after a 
different number of processing steps, these models can explain why the 
number of processed dimensions should depend upon the characteristics 
of a choice pair. For similar alternatives, the attractiveness differences of 
one or several dimensions may be comparatively small, and therefore 
more such attractiveness differences must be accumulated before the 
criterion is reached than for choice pairs with large attractiveness 
differences favouring the same alternative on the several different 
dimensions. These models could thus explain why the number of 
processed dimensions increased with the similarity of a choice pair. 
The central postulate of criterion-dependent choice models is that 
information processing is terminated as soon as a criterion is reached or 
surpassed. Therefore, the most extreme accumulated attractiveness 
differences must always occur in the last processing step. In order to test 
this hypothesis, some supplementary assumptions about the calculation 
of attractiveness differences and their accumulation over several pro-
cessing steps are required. We assume that the attractiveness difference 
of a feature pair on one dimension can be approximated by the difference 
of a subject's individual attractiveness ratings of the two respective 
features. For example, consider the magazines Capital and Der Spiegel: 
If a subject rated the attractiveness of the prices of 6.00 D M and 4.00 
D M for a magazine as 3 and 5, respectively, the attractiveness difference 
between Capital and Der Spiegel on the dimension "price" would be 
approximated by the value 3 — 5= —2. The accumulation of attractive-
ness differences over several processing steps is similarly approximated 
by the summation of the difference scores of the processed dimensions.3 
For brevity, the sum of difference scores after j dimensions have been 
processed will be termed the counter value after j dimensions. This 
criterion-dependent choice model thus predicts that the most extreme 
counter value is always obtained for the processing step that terminates 
the choice process. The most extreme counter value is a positive or 
negative number whose absolute value is larger than the absolute value 
of any other counter value. 
In order to test this prediction, the backward order position of the 
most extreme counter value was determined for every choice pair and 
every subject. Since the second experiment completely replicated the 
results of the first one, only the data of the first experiment are analysed. 
From the attractiveness ratings and the record of the inspected dimen-
sions, the counter value of every single processing step was determined. 
Similarly to a backward learning curve (Kintsch, 1970), it was then 
determined how frequently the most extreme counter value occurred in 
each position in backward order (i.e., was the most extreme counter 
'A measurement analysis of the present criterion-dependent model, which postulates 
the summation of attractiveness difference scores shows that the underlying attractiveness 
values must constitute an interval scale. Since the collected ratings may well violate this 
prerequisite (Albert, D., unpublished data and measurement analyses) these ratings may 
only be considered a rough approximation rather than a well specified estimation of the 
subjects' attractiveness values. 
value in the last, second-to-last, or one of the other positions). These 
empirically determined frequencies were compared to the frequency 
predictions that were derived under the assumption that the most 
extreme counter value is equally likely to occur in each position. This 
assumption served as the null hypothesis. The predictions of the null 
hypothesis and the empirical data are shown in Figure 3. A j2 t e s t 
showed that the most extreme counter value was significantly more 
likely to occur in the last position than would be expected under the null 
hypothesis, %2(9> N= 240) = 485.2, p< 0.001. This result thus supports 
the central assumption of the criterion-dependent choice models. 
The criterion-dependent choice model may also be used to predict 
the subjects' individual choices. For those 397 choice pairs where less 
than 11 dimensions had been processed, the sign of the most extreme 
counter value predicts which alternative should have been chosen. For 
these choice pairs, 80% of the observed choices were correctly predicted 
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Figure 3. Frequency distributions of the maximum counter values for the 11 
dimensions in backward processing order. 
Note: Black columns are the observed frequencies, white columns are the 
frequencies which are predicted under the assumption of the null hypothesis. 
by the model. There were 23 cases where all 11 dimensions were 
inspected. In these cases, the last rather than the most extreme counter 
value should predict a subject's choice. For these pairs, 83% of the 
choices were correctly predicted. It thus appears that criterion-depen-
dent choice models can account quite well for the reported data. 
The few incorrect predictions do not necessarily indicate a structural 
difference between the model predictions and the observed data. Since 
the particular choice model that was examined in this study is determi-
nistic, the deviations between the predicted and the observed data could 
also be due to some error component, possibly introduced by inaccura-
cies in the empirically determined attractiveness ratings, which the 
present model did not take into consideration. Whether the incorrect 
model predictions are better accounted for by the assumption of some 
error component or by a different rule for calculating the attractiveness 
differences on a dimension was investigated by additional post hoc 
analyses. 
In order to evaluate whether primacy or recency weights (Wallsten 
and Barton, 1982) in the accumulation of the attractiveness differences 
could account for the incorrect model predictions, average attractiveness 
differences were calculated for every processing position of the dimen-
sions in forward and backward order. For the incorrectly predicted 
choices, the average attractiveness difference of the dimension that was 
processed in the last processing step was 0.23 in favour of the chosen 
alternative. For the dimension in all other positions of the forward and 
backward processing order, the rejected alternative was more attractive 
on average. Although these results may indicate a recency effect, the 
incorrect model predictions can be completely accounted for neither by 
primacy nor by recency-weights, which would more strongly emphasize 
the attractiveness differences of the dimensions that were processed first 
and last. 
Since, instead of the present cardinal attractiveness differences, 
respective scores could also be determined according to the specifica-
tions of the majority rule (May, 1954), it could be suggested that instead 
of the amount by which one alternative is better than the other on a 
dimension it only matters whether an alternative is better, equal or 
worse on a dimension. Instead of the summation of cardinal attractive-
ness differences, such a rule would thus only count how often an 
alternative was better than the other on the processed dimensions 
(summation of ordinal differences). However, since for the incorrectly 
predicted choices the attractiveness ratings showed higher values for the 
rejected alternative's features for 72% of the processed dimensions, such 
a rule could also not completely account for the incorrectly predicted 
choices. 
Whereas for the incorrectly predicted choices the chosen alternatives 
showed higher attractiveness ratings on only 28% of the processed 
dimensions, for the correctly predicted choices the chosen alternatives 
showed higher attractiveness ratings for 56% of the feature pairs of the 
processed dimensions. The average attractiveness difference between 
the chosen and rejected alternatives on the processed dimensions was 
1.09 and —0.40 for the correctly and incorrectly predicted choices, 
respectively. For the incorrectly predicted choices, the rejected alterna-
tives thus show higher average attractiveness ratings than the chosen 
alternatives. Also, the absolute value of the average attractiveness 
difference on the processed dimensions is clearly smaller for the incor-
rectly predicted choices than for the correctly predicted choices. The 
incorrect predictions could thus well be explained by the assumption 
that the attractiveness ratings were not completely identical to the 
subjects' respective attractiveness values at the time of the choice 
process. In particular, assume that the true attractiveness values of 
alternatives x and y of the features processed in the i-th processing step 
are v(x^) and v(y{). The respective empirical ratings are given by: 
and 
<) ' i ) = *>0'i) + £( ) ' i ) 
where e(x^) and e(y^) shall be identically and independently distributed 
random variables, with a symmetric distribution around an expected 
value of zero.4 Consequently, r(x-) and r(y{) would also be random 
variables. Thus a random variable 8; = z(xt) — z(y-X where 8< = 8 for all 
i= 1, . . . , 11 would be responsible for the deviations between the true 
attractiveness difference v(x^) — v{y^) and the empirically determined 
rating difference r(x{) — r(y{). The error variables 8 could often produce a 
(empirically determined) most extreme counter value that our analysis 
would record for some other than the last processing step. In some cases, 
the errors may even accumulate over several processing steps in one 
direction, so that the empirically determined most extreme counter 
value would even differ by its sign from the "true" most extreme 
counter value. According to the proposed post hoc explanation, such 
4For example, if only discrete attractiveness values are assumed, it could be postulated 
that for all features x: 
v(x) e {3, 4, 5} 
and that 
PrleW = - 1] = .30; Pr[e(xt) = 0] = .40; Pr[e(x.) - 1] = .30. 
In order to avoid the introduction of more mathematical symbols, our notation will not 
distinguish between a random variable and a particular realization of that random variable. 
incorrect choice predictions would be less likely to occur than errors in 
the empirically determined position of the most extreme counter value. 
Since this relation was indeed observed in the present results, the value 
fluctuation assumption appears to sufficiently account for the errors of 
the model predictions. Since the incorrect choice predictions are 
presumably due to the accumulation of error influences, the absolute 
value of the most extreme counter values should be clearly smaller for 
the incorrectly predicted choices than for the correctly predicted 
choices: with the respective average values being 4.5 and 7.4, this 
prediction was also confirmed by the present data. Inaccuracies in the 
determination of the attractiveness ratings (which would also be 
expected from the Thurstonian assumptions; Thurstone, 1927) thus 
appear to supply the best account for the incorrect, as well as the correct, 
model predictions. 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
It may be concluded that despite some inaccuracies in the determination 
of the feature attractiveness values, the criterion-dependent choice 
models were found to account for the reported data quite well. These 
models also offer an explanation and a detailed prediction of the 
selectivity and adaptiveness of the cognitive choice processes, which 
were demonstrated in two experiments. 
The criterion-dependent choice models are similar to multidimensio-
nal scaling (MDS) models (Borg, 1981; Shepard, 1974) in that objects 
are assumed to have an underlying multidimensional structure. Multidi-
mensional scaling techniques serve to identify a uniform multidimensio-
nal representation from similarity or other judgments for all objects 
under consideration. M D S thus assumes that the same number of 
dimensions is employed in every single judgment. However, by the 
current process tracing method it was demonstrated that the number of 
psychologically relevant dimensions in a given task may systematically 
vary from one pair of objects to the other. Based upon the reported 
results it may be expected that M D S could benefit from taking such 
selectivity and adaptiveness characteristics into account. Such charac-
teristics could also be employed for further assisting human decision-
making (Jungermann, 1980) by reducing the effort of making a choice 
while preserving its quality. Attempting to incorporate selectivity and 
adaptiveness heuristics into decision support systems such as M A U D 
(Humphreys and McFadden, 1980) may therefore be a promising 
enterprise. 
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